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【手机验证领28彩金不限id】第291期:10月16日 Ben Charoenwong助理教授
浏览次数:709次 | 发布时间:2019-10-16

手机验证领28彩金不限id第291期:1016Ben Charoenwong助理教授

本期主题:Public Pessimism: How and Why Do Managers Use Forecasts to Guide the Market?


摘要:

We study Japanese public companies who must publicly forecast profitability annually and respond to a government survey obtaining the same numbers confidentially. While bothforecasts predict realized investment, public forecasts are pessimistic relative to confidential forecasts. Firms with higher capital market pressure and executive compensation incentives are more publicly pessimistic. This public-confidential forecast gap explains higher future returns,earnings surprises and higher future compensation the following year for company officers but not rank-and-file employees. Moreover, the public pessimism turns into public optimism when equity-dependent firms are financially constrained. Our results suggest public firms strategically trade off revealing positive information to financiers in exchange for optimizing manager goalposts.


报告人:Ben Charoenwong助理教授, 新加坡国立大学

时间:1016日(周三) 1215

地点:明德主楼515教师交流室


报告人简介:

Ben Charoenwong is an Assistant Professor of Finance at the National University of Singapore. He completed his PhD in Finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business in 2017. Before that, he graduated from the University of Michigan - Ann Arbor in 2012 with a B.S. in Honors Economics, Honors Statistics, and Financial Mathematics with Highest Distinction. His research interests are agency conflicts in various contexts, household finance, corporate finance, and empirical asset pricing. His research includes studying the interaction of supply chain and financial leverage decisions, pricing the voting component of common stock, and the regulation of investment advisers.


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